Policing styles have evolved over the past 170 years in direct correlation to the predominant need or ruling conditions as determined by the developmental periods of America’s systems of politics, economics, and sociology. In the 1840s, just following the deaths of thousands of Cherokees who were deceived and sent away per President Van Buren’s order upon the Trail of Tears, and just as the war with Mexico was being ignited—all events being related to the business of expansion by a growing, greedy, and self-centered people--which, whether pro-war or anti-war, the majority of political leaders desired, as they were entirely motivated and supported by Capitalist powers of landownership and its spoils, as well as industrial progression. Racial discontent in the South, coupled with class struggles in the North, such as the Anti-Renter movement in New York—one of many riots and strikes that would surface over the era--would see a growing need for policing in the communities, in spite of the military rule. Sheriffs would be hired to act as agents for the landowners to collect rents from tenants—little more than elected errand boys--but disorderly conduct would typically be handled by military interventions, especially in large-scale uprisings. In fact, it is not surprising that the first police department in New York was formed in 1844, one year before the rejection of the Anti-Rent bill, and the consequential revolt.
As more immigrants flooded American soils, and populations increased--the population of New York alone went from 13,000 in 1820 to 1,000,000 in 1860 (Zinn, 1995)—there became an increasing need to stabilize the American economy in order to quell an economic turbulence that caused such devastating conditions of destitution and filth-ridden living conditions that spread disease to the lower class masses. It was crucial for politics to appeal at least to the rhetoric of Democracy in order to raise a civilian sense of worth and recognition in the labor class, while the Capitalist class held the power of wealth and property, and, therefore, the power of law through political influence. Politicians’ interests lay in the welfare of the economy because the Capitalists were the financiers of American growth and held territorial power, and only landowners had the right to vote. This gave the police the compulsory role of being the governmental “thugs” who acted as strong-arm enforcers of laws that would benefit the wealthy materialists who possessed interest in the welfare of nothing more than their purses. Laws were created first and foremost to protect the assets of the wealthy and to prevent sedition, whether this discontent was natively incited or suspected of activist immigrants, such as the French, who had just come from their own revolution abroad.
Further, as prices for basic necessities, such as food and housing were increased, wages were offset in favor of industry by either lengthening labor hours or quotas for productions. It was not uncommon for entire families, including children around four years of age, to be working in poor factory conditions for sixty and seventy hours per week, earning livings in ghettoes of disease-ridden buildings, while wealthy landlords and factory owners were living in luxurious homes in the country.
Strikes and riots ensued in the names of numerous causes, such as the Flour Riot of 1837 in New York, because of these conditions, and police, although not yet organized into formal departments, were employed by the government authorities—i.e., governors, mayors—as muscle to overcome and disperse (often with military assistance) the thousands of people who would participate in these protests and inhibit industrial or trade function. This “order maintenance” was the standard of policing during the political era, and it was not uncommon for the police to exercise a certain promiscuity of employment, even working in league with the criminal element if the bribe or corruption, e.g. blackmail, was effective. It was the era that the Watchman, the civilian guard, used discretion based upon personal interests, hearsay, or circumstantial evidence to handle the more traditional crimes, while serving the political and economic rule as a foot-soldier in the mitigation of what the powerful defined as seditious acts or behavior. The Department of Justice even backed up a sprawling organization of “upstanding members of society,” such as bankers, railroad men, and the like, numbering nearly 100,000 across six hundred cities and towns to act as agents under the heading of American Protective League, akin to others such as the American Defense Society, formed in 1917, which enlisted patrols to put an end to sedition. As America was entrenching itself in the first world war, lack of enthusiasm in citizens and outright opposition of Socialists caused the government to bear down hard on “treasonous attitudes” in order to push for the war that would enhance the economy, a much needed boost at the time. Their method of mitigating treason would be sending these “agents” to investigate the personal lives of suspects in order to establish seditious behavior. (Zinn, 1995).
Police became more necessary than ever to deter uprisings and activism; however, because of their close ties with the civilians in their neighborhoods, they were often of little efficacy, so the military would be employed by the government to intervene, thus, the creation of the Posse Comitatus Act in 1878, Sec. 15 of which states: “From and after the passage of this act it shall not be lawful to employ any part of the Army of the United States, as a posse comitatus, or otherwise, for the purpose of executing the laws, except in such cases and under such circumstances as such employment of said force may be expressly authorized by the Constitution or by act of Congress; and no money appropriated by this act shall be used to pay any of the expenses incurred in the employment of any troops in violation of this section And any person willfully violating the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction thereof shall be punished by fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars or imprisonment not exceeding two years or by both such fine and imprisonment.” According to an article written by John W. Probst, Lieutenant Colonel and Commander, 90th Missile Security Forces Squadron, F. E. Warren Air Force Base, U.S. Air Force: “The provision created by "except in such cases and under such circumstances as such employment of said force may be authorized by the Constitution or by act of Congress" allowed the use of federal forces against the 1919 rioters in Chicago, the so-called Bonus Marchers in Washington, D.C., in 1932, and the railroad workers who went on strike during the administration of President Truman, who temporarily nationalized the railroads under the Army Corps of Engineers (Baker, 1999).” Just as with most other regulations, the government imposes a compulsory double standard, so there are loopholes to the act making it viable for congress to utilize military intervention in civilian matters, e.g.: the Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Officials Act in 1981. Probst (2004) goes on to say: “Congress passed the Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Officials Act in 1981 to clarify the Reconstruction-era Posse Comitatus Act statute in key areas, particularly with regard to the use of the military to train civilian law enforcement personnel and to provide such personnel with military equipment and facilities to assist civilian police in enforcing drug laws.”
The terrorists that founded and formed America were facing their own internal terrorism, and the existing powers were determined to push their economic growth beyond any point of return no matter what the “necessary costs” of doing so.
This method of the Watchman style of policing carried on for decades, into the sixties, especially during times of rebellion from civil rights and equal rights activists. Minorities were beginning to gain an activist foothold, and they wanted to be seen and heard, treated as equals to everyone else, and to pursue the spoils of their labor, as well as the rights to which the rest of society was obliged. The martial Watchman style of policing has been effective--especially as it is influenced by military structure and technology, thus, imparting a militaristic mindset which is a tenuous application to citizens versus enemies of the country (Weber, 1999)--in suppressing the desires for substantial civilian uprisings, particularly with the advent of sophisticated weapons of mass impact, sheer numbers of officers, as well as advanced technologies that are not available to the public. The initial tyrants took quick hold of the reigns and effectively annihilated and pacified opposition, subduing the public with force and a powerful grip of territories, while further mollifying them with vices, i.e., cigarettes, alcohol (which would lead to escalated public drunkenness, prohibition, then a predictable abrogation), moving pictures, and advancements in technology to make life “easier,” to mitigate resentment.
This style of policing is still evident today, and it is my opinion that it would be logistically predominant in neighborhoods and regions in which strong social bonds exist between police and communities, mirroring the earlier days of corruption and bias. I can also see this mode of operations prevailing where strong unanimity or subcultural cohesion exists within a region regarding its political, social, or religious predisposition or preference, which then influences the community policing principles. For example, an officer who patrols the neighborhood in which he was raised, or lives, or has strong familial or social ties may very well exercise a Watchman-like discretion when dealing with “hoodlums” who disturb the relative peace of the officer’s community. As well, officers, perhaps even more readily found in the bonds of Team Policing, may be prone to elements of mob-mentality in their neighborhoods or districts toward any outsiders who enter their territories. Much like a gang defending its turf, officers may very well justify martial law against anyone who violates or opposes their community’s dominant beliefs, even supplementing Watchman policing with unyielding black-and-white Legalistic technicalities, leaving no margin of error for unfavorable outsiders, in order to “keep the peace.” In fact, the community may also encourage such order maintenance. A predominantly white, wealthy community may conveniently “look the other way” while officers “educate” a minority for violating societal expectations.
I can see the logic in the integration of the Legalistic policing style in the early twentieth century, particularly as we moved into a century of foreign wars. Masses of young men were being enlisted—routinely by conscription—and were emigrated from society to fight battles in other countries or at sea as the United States sought opportunities for international profiteering, if not major global clout, and intervened in foreign political situations. Large numbers of young men, the predominant demographic of criminal acts, were being exported from the community. Wars stimulate economy, as well, and this was much needed after the stock market crash (Great Depression) in 1929. The generation born into the poverty of that era, destined for the compulsory criminal tendencies suspected to arise from such conditions of deprivation and desperation, would find themselves a “ticket” so to speak, to an opportunity of salvation through either joining the war effort directly, or benefiting from the pick-up in the economy created by it.
In the 1930s, the Reform or Progressive Era for the police, at the threshold of World War II, America was shifting focus from warring internally, as it was becoming relatively unified in directing its elicited indignation at “the enemy” entities overseas. Police departments were left the charge of American soils, and justice was in need of tempering while scientific policing was not yet significant for inter-social/community-oriented strategies. Thus, by-the-book Legalistic style and an at least more professional approach to policing develops as officers begin to see this line of work as a budding career opportunity (Weber, 1999). As the period progresses, wars would continue to bring work to the public, but a greater rift in the dichotomy of active protests and a new wave of Jingoism throughout the country increase. This growing concern for constitutional rights in America would reasonably give the local police an opportunity to direct efforts toward reform and exercise a more professional crime-fighting approach. With the progress of scientific management, advancements in technology, and a broadening understanding of human behavior, police have been able to turn their attention toward figuring out the how and the why of crimes while becoming more effective at solving the who and making more arrests.
Organizational structure of police rank-and-file emulated military chain of command and new roles within began to develop, creating a working division between line operations and staff operations. Diane Cecilia Weber, a writer on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, in her 1999 report titled: Warrior Cops: The Ominous Growth of Paramilitarism in American Police Departments states: “To gain control of the rank and file, police chiefs assigned military ranks and insignia to personnel, and some departments required military drills.” (p. 6) She also states: “State and local police departments are increasingly accepting the military as a model for their behavior and outlook.” (p. 1) I would tend to speculate that this sophisticated and professional new approach in policing would be seen as a potential deterrent to would-be criminals. However, other conditions such as subcultural loyalties, the pros of jail-time versus living in the streets, and the potential exponential pay-offs of crime for the effort involved, may very well have offset any deterrent properties of the new Legalistic style.
I view the Legalistic style as kind of a house-cleaning style—a step toward tying up loose ends from the political era—sweeping out the cobwebs and organizing the inventory, so to speak. Legalistic departments seemed to want to lose the image of the corrupted thugs of the political era by implementing a concise method of strict rule enforcement. Military image was sharp and clean, for example, the State Trooper “Smokey bear” caps resembling the Drill Sergeant caps of the military, along with uniform design, decoration and chain-of-command, so the clinical Legalistic style seemed to follow suit. Technically, according to this style, the slightest variance from the law on the books would constitute justification for legal consequences. I would imagine that the young liberal generations of the fifties, sixties, and seventies would have considered this form of Fascism totally “uptight” and unfair; a passive aggressive form of being monitored and controlled by “big brother.”
In this era, the police did not erase the poignant contextual image of being abusive and racist from the war periods, and now they donned an Authoritarian hat; the younger generation would consider them to be bullies who supported wars that America shouldn’t be fighting, particularly during the sixties and seventies. The police still served a political lord, but they were not military, and they needed to find new ways to fight crime in society, or face the potential for the rebirth of vigilantism or revolt by a public that feared for its safety and welfare as crime rates were still rising in spite of the professional policing. The police needed to develop skills necessary to interact with people that were used to the distant and disconnected police organization.
It was later in this era that the image of the police officer would begin to take on the more hero-like crime-fighter to the young generation. This is the image that we came to know on television shows; the westerns made heroes of nuggets of truth from the vigilante days of Charles Lynch and Wyatt Earp--stereotyping the once honorable Native Americans as ruthless, murderous savages--and the new shows, such as CHiPs and Adam 12, turned the police into action/adventure supermen of the modern age.
In comes the Community era of policing. This would be the foundation of the Service style of police working in league with the community to try to prevent crime through an active maintenance of mutualism. The same operational strategies that have been used for decades still apply in this new era, although methods have evolved in many ways. Police still patrol beats or districts by foot, horse, bicycle, motorcycle, car, or even boat or ORV in some cases, in order to establish a presence that imparts a sense of security to the general public. Routine incident response is becoming more apparent in the PCR practices—except in the Legalistic style that doesn’t like to bother with minor infractions and disturbances that they figure can either be resolved without their intervention or overlooked as trivial, not worth legal attention until a crime is actually committed, most likely thriving in middle- to upper-class districts with relatively low crime rates.
The integrations and applications of all three styles may function in a rotational manner, the prevailing factors of crime and civil pressures in society at any given time determining which style to apply and to what degree. Otherwise, community input, political influence, and officer discretions will determine the predominance of any particular style. I can see them overlapping one another quite easily.
In the community policing model, response times to routine incidents and emergencies are going to be considered as a measure of responsibility and efficacy of the police by the public who, in this case of the “business” of policing, are the clients who retain the services of the organization. This is also where we begin to see a tentative tether to political influences in contrast to public service in this PCR relationship, which I see as a risky line for the police to walk.
The delineation of community service relative to politics is blurred when police seek tactics to implement crime prevention programs and service in their communities. I would think that the police must become liaisons of sorts between their communities and the government in order to vie for strategies, monies, or sanctions for crime prevention. In order to execute programs such as DARE, Project Identification for children, community/neighborhood renovations, and other campaigns, the police departments need to appeal, particularly on a local level, to the government for funding and equipment at the very least.
Community Oriented Policing is a fantastic public relations move, gaining the favor and admiration of the public by making officers more approachable, not unlike social workers with badges--and functioning more as a service industry rather than an Authoritarian chaperone in the community. However, paramilitarism is an inevitable by-product of police-military interactions and cooperation, especially in this era of national security. Unlike the Native American form of national security, which was attempting to create a peaceful coexistence with Europeans, the modern form of national security is based upon paranoid restriction of civil liberties, heightened oppressive scrutiny, and integration of more military tactics and technology. According to an Eastern Kentucky University study of SWAT teams, performed by Peter Kraska and Victor Kappelar in 1997: “…nearly 90 percent of the police departments surveyed in cities with populations over 50,000 had paramilitary units, as did 70 percent of the departments surveyed in communities with populations under 50,000.” (p. 5-6)
What this tells me is that the war on drugs and gang violence, and now the war on terrorism, is just that: war. Our police are precisely expected to be fighting battles on a daily basis to combat issues with which they’ve been charged by an increasingly fearful society. Further—and possibly the more poignant influence of paramilitarism in police function—is the protection of assets that the government has established. Wars are truly sponsored by economics, and the government seeks to preserve the functioning of the economy, as well as the fealty of an ignorantly blissful people to do so. It is proven and obvious that the government is lustful of power and greed, as are most modern people, which is why it is willing to send hundreds of thousands of citizens to their deaths in order to satiate those desires—deaths for otiose concepts of “freedom” and “peace” that the soldiers will never enjoy. The propaganda of Jingoism is powerful, however, and the public is impressionable—particularly so considering the limited scope of reality and regulation we are provided by those who rule our world.
In light of this mentality of preserving the peace by enforcing law and warring against crime, the decentralized levels of policing become centralized once again as their efforts coordinate and training, information and intelligence, and tactics are shared. Now, the federal police work on an international level, the state police function regarding statewide transactions or occurrences, and the local police maintain community relations and order. Although the decentralized surface delineations are relatively clear, they still function as an increasingly focusing centralized unit that is more deeply imbedding itself, as seeds taking root in soil, in the social lives of the citizenry. Those personal ties in the more unprofessional era of the police in the early 20th century are now re-established but in a more professional manner. Instead of (or along with in many cities now) cameras on the streets, police are installed as chaperones in the community under the intention of being as helpful and community oriented as the Boy Scouts, with the charisma of low-level politicians, and with the disposition of soldiers. And in light of recent acts of terrorism, much of the public seems to welcome the intervention with open arms. If the police happen to violate the newly earned trust or the civil liberties of the public, especially on the local level, this effort has the potential to quickly turn in an unfavorable direction.
The major weakness of this structure and function is: thanks to the coercion of all levels of police and military forces by corrupt politics and industry, and to the lack of knowledge and care for the welfare of the natural world, our society continues to create laws and regulations that directly and indirectly harm the environment and all species on this planet in order that we satiate our wants and desires at further expense to our spirits. Humans no longer measure effort at a cost of energy crucial for survival; we now measure worth of effort to cost in comfort. Economically-centered law enforcement has facilitated the ability for humans to continue to expand their range and numbers, wiping-out and harming critical habitats for wildlife and eliminating species. Laws protect the wealthy from any real accountability for destruction of habitat in the name of progress (remember Jimmy Pflueger and the Kaloko Dam, for instance?), and laws protect the weak, fostering propagation of poor genetics and evasion of natural selection and natural laws, thus, impacting the natural world in a negative way with overpopulation and resulting by-products of pollution, stress, fragmentation, and depletion. This country was founded upon false principles of materialism and greed, and it is in large part credited to police and military acting in the name of political justice that our society has become ignorant to the value and necessity of protecting the natural world in a more substantial way than only preserving its economic value as economics are not real. The police and military industrial complexes support the institution of these laws and maintain, through force and violations of natural freedoms, the destructive momentum for the decadence and false pretense of the human society.
References:
1. Zinn, H. (1995). A People’s History of the United States: 1492-Present (Rev. and updated ed.) New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.
2. Probst, J. (2004, July). The Posse Comitatus Act: What does it Mean to Local Law Enforcement? The Police Chief Magazine. (Vol. 71, No. 7). Retrieved Aug. 3, 2007, from http://policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=print_display&
article_id=335&issue_id=72004
3. Baker, B. (1999, November 1). The Origins of the Posse Comitatus. Air and Space Chronicles. Maxwell Air Force Base.
4. Weber, D. (1999, August 26). Warrior Cops: The Ominous Growth of Paramilitarism in American Police Departments. CATO Institute Briefing Papers (No. 50). Retrieved Aug. 3, 2007 from http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a37d86efe2982.htm
5. Kraska, P., & Kappeler, V. (1997). Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units. Social Problems, 44, 5-6
Restorative Justice Article
